Two important factors in determining how investors select portfolios and how asset prices and returns are determined are taxes and risk. Absent risk, the effect of taxes has been captured by models that assume the existence of tax clienteles and characterize implicit taxes contained in the equilibrium returns of securities as a consequence of arbitrage by marginal clienteles. Absent taxes, the effect of risk has been captured by models in which arbitrage by risk averse investors leads to risk premia linearly related to economy-wide risk factors. When both risk and taxes are present, they interact in complex ways that eliminate the clean results obtainable when each characteristic is considered in isolation. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the effects of taxes and risk on asset prices and returns can be linearly separated under the realistic assumption that there exists a parsimonious set of index futures contracts that spans the non-diversifiable risk factors in asset prices. The key implication of this separation is that under relatively weak assumptions, researchers can validly consider either taxes or risk in isolation, as if the other does not exist.
I. Introduction
Considerable attention in finance has been given to assessing the effect of taxes and risk on investors' portfolio choice and asset pricing. These two characteristics, taxes and risk, have typically been considered separately to facilitate model tractability. While much progress has been achieved by considering taxes and risk independently, less progress has been made in models that consider them simultaneously as the two can interact in complex ways. This paper will develop a model with both taxes and risk, and demonstrate that under realistic assumptions, the effects of taxes and risk on portfolio choice and asset pricing can be linearly separated, and that the equilibrium effects of each characteristic (taxes or risk) are the same as they would be if the other characteristic is ignored (i.e. tax effects are the same with risk-aversion as they would be with risk-neutrality, and risk premia on assets are the same with capital income taxes as they would be under lump sum taxation). This implies that it is legitimate to model taxes and risk separately as has been commonly done in past research.
Absent consideration of risk, much progress can be (and has been) made in addressing the issue of how taxes affect portfolio choice and capital structure. Consider the most basic portfolio selection problem involving two securities, debt and equity. The income from debt ownership is fully taxed at the investor's marginal tax rate, while the income from equity ownership (largely in the form of capital gains) is effectively taxed at a lower rate (due to a lower statutory rate, benefit of deferral, selective realization of gains and losses, and step-up of basis at death). Hence, equity is a more attractive investment than debt from a tax perspective.
However, some investors, particularly long-term investors in high tax brackets, have a relatively strong tax preference for equity, while tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds, face no tax differential from interest and capital gains income. Ignoring risk considerations, these variations in tax attributes lead to the formation of tax clienteles, with investors who have a relatively large tax preference for equity investing in equity while investors with a relatively low (or zero) tax preference for equity invest in bonds. Equilibrium with this clientele formation requires that stocks provide a lower pre-tax return than bonds, known as an implicit tax, because stock investors incur this cost (reduction in pre-tax return) to avoid the explicit tax penalty associated with bonds. The exact implicit tax will equal the difference in tax rates on debt and equity for a marginal clientele that is indifferent between the two securities and that arbitrages them.
This type of tax clientele / implicit tax model has considerable utility. The model can be generalized to consider a variety of different assets and clienteles, such as municipal bonds, preferred stock, and common stock with different dividend yields, as well as more complex variations in taxpayer characteristics, such as corporations with low tax rates on dividend income. 1 The key in such models is the identification of the marginal clientele between any two securities that determines the magnitude of the implicit tax. 2 The model can also be used to explore other issues in finance, such as optimal capital structure. Miller (1977) develops a general equilibrium model based on the basic tax clientele model in which corporations adjust the supplies of stocks and bonds to change the marginal clientele and so force the implicit tax to equal the corporate tax rate (and equalize the cost of capital for issuers). With the cost of capital equalized, each firm is indifferent regarding its capital structure, and thus the Modigliani-Miller (1958) leverage irrelevance result holds even in the presence of taxes.
1 Williams (2001) considers clientele formation and implicit taxes with all these variations. 2 The notion of a marginal clientele is commonly invoked in tax research in financial markets. For example, in studies of municipal bonds, the primary focus has been on identifying the marginal clientele and the alternative asset (taxable debt or equity) that the marginal clientele arbitrages against municipal bonds. Williams (2001), Mankiw and Poterba (1996 ), Fortune (1988 ), and Trczinka (1982 The separation of tax and risk optimization means that investors can achieve perfect tax optimization through clientele formation and portfolio separation (with no diversification across asset types) while simultaneously achieving optimal risk exposure through futures trading (which does not alter tax circumstances, as will be discussed later). Expected rates of return on assets are linear functions of their covariances with the systematic risk factors (as in the standard APT model) and their tax attributes (as in standard clientele theory). The key implication of this separation is that under relatively weal assumptions, researchers can ignore risk in developing models of how taxes influence portfolio choice and clientele behavior and can ignore taxes in developing models of how risk affects asset prices and expected returns. A model with an assumption of riskless assets (or equivalently risk neutrality) remains valid even if assets are risky and investors risk-averse so long as the random variables in the model are regarded as certainty equivalents, 5 and a model with an assumption of no taxes remains valid in terms of its predictions for risk premia, which are independent of the tax system.
Section II reviews the prior literature and motivates the current study. Section III derives the tax / risk separation theorem. Section IV discusses some extensions and applications of the theorem. Section V concludes the paper. Appendix A includes proves of the proposition and corollaries in the paper, and Appendix B outlines the nomenclature used in the paper.
II. Prior Research
The effects of taxes and risk on portfolio choice and asset pricing have been examined in numerous studies considering each of the effects separately. A seminal paper that considers the 5 Unlike the case in the absence of futures (discussed in note 4), risk premia are well-defined and universally agreed upon, since everyone now optimizes risk exposure. Thus, state prices, an equivalent martingale measure, and the certainty equivalent of risky streams are well-defined constructs, with only state prices varying for differently taxed effect of taxes is Miller (1977) , which also analyzes capital structure choice. Miller shows that if investors are risk-neutral, they will separate into two clienteles based on their tax attributes.
Investors with a relatively strong preference for capital gains income will only own stocks while investors with a relatively weak preference for capital gains income will only own bonds. An implicit tax arises between debt and equity returns to offset the explicit tax difference between them for the marginal tax clientele that is indifferent between the two securities.
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As noted above, Miller (1977) can short $1000 value of another stock, but if instead you own a $1000 bond, you cannot short any stock at all). These assumptions, particularly the unconventional short sale constraint, are highly restrictive. They are designed to allow investors to hold two portfolios, the market portfolio and a riskless stock portfolio. Bond clientele members (those with a relatively low tax preference for capital gains) do not eschew stocks entirely, as in Miller, but instead hold a long assets (and varying in a proportional manner), while the equivalent martingale measure is completely independent of the tax system. position in the market portfolio and a short position in the riskless equity so that their net equity position is zero.
In addition to considering the effect of taxes on financial markets, numerous studies consider the effect of risk on asset pricing and portfolio choice. The vast majority of such models exclude taxes from the analysis (e.g. the CAPM in Sharpe, 1964 , and the APT in Ross, 1976 Papers that have considered how taxes affect risk-based asset pricing models include Brennan (1970) , which modifies the CAPM under the assumption of homogeneous (across investors) but differential taxation of dividends and capital gains. In this model, the intercept in the CAPM is a linear function of dividend yield. Elton and Gruber (1978) extend this analysis to consider tax-wise heterogeneous investors and find that if investors believe that asset prices follow Brennan's tax-augmented CAPM, then they will choose a composite portfolio consisting of a fraction of the market portfolio and a fraction of a dividend-weighted portfolio. However, Long (1977) demonstrates that mean-variance efficiency is not preserved under taxation, casting doubt on the CAPM approach in the presence of taxes.
Another stream of research involves investors choosing among a set of non-redundant differently-taxed assets (due to different dividend yields) without borrowing / short sale constraints. For example, Gordon and Bradford (1980) model portfolio selection as a choice among a set of risky stocks with different dividend yields (and thus different levels of taxation). 6 Miller further shows that the total debt and equity issued by firms in the economy will be adjusted to assure that the marginal clientele has a relative tax preference for equity equal to the corporate income tax, and as a result (2000) in which the choice of dividend policy by firms is endogenous (and motivated by signaling). As in Gordon and Bradford, expected returns for the two firms differ by an amount that depends on both tax rates and risk aversion parameters. Also, as in Gordon and Bradford, their model excludes the prospect of redundant securities, which would lead to unbounded tax arbitrage. Ross (1987) for the economy that is independent of the tax system. This is made possible by introducing sufficient redundancy into the set of assets available to investors so that they can achieve any risk exposure desired while maintaining tax efficiency in their portfolios. Thus, redundancy itself is the instrument that allows separation of tax and risk effects in asset prices and returns. Unlike the models of Gordon and Bradford (1980) and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) in which redundant assets would lead to unbounded tax arbitrage and no equilibrium, this paper will achieve redundancy through the introduction of stock index futures contracts that are by themselves useless for pure tax arbitrage purposes, but completely effective at providing access to any desired risk exposure while maintaining a tax-efficient portfolio.
III. Portfolio Choice Model
Consider a model consisting of N firms, M investors, and a government. In the first period, exchange of securities occurs. In the second and final period, firms realize cash flow and distribute it to owners of their securities, including both stocks and bonds, based on linear combination of securities with a particular tax treatment that has identical returns to a linear combination of securities with a different tax treatment.
predetermined allocation rules. 8 The government levies personal taxes on individual interest income on bonds and capital gains on stock and futures returns.
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The index futures contract is a third type of security; there are H index futures available for trade in financial markets. Each index futures contract corresponds to an index of stocks (and possibly bonds). In the first period, when parties contract, no money changes hands; however, a futures price for the index is specified. In the second period, the buyer of the contract receives the difference between the actual value of the index and the futures price. She pays the difference to the seller if the futures price is higher. In equilibrium, this contract must have zero net demand by investors.
10
Let r bn + ν n be the return on bonds and r en + ε n be the return on stock for firm n (with r bn and r en their expectations, respectively) where each return is the ratio of the second period change in value to the current price. Also r fh + η h is the profit on a long position in a futures contract representing one dollar of index h (with r fh its expectation). That profit is the difference between the second period price of the index and the futures price. If index h consists of weights I hn for the stock in each firm n (such that ∑ = = N n hn
Investors engage in costless trade of securities to maximize expected utility. Utility is a function of an investor's final wealth: W 1m , which is the product of his initial wealth, W 0m , and one plus the after-tax return on his portfolio. Only two restrictions are imposed on the utility function U m : it must be concave and increasing in wealth.
Each investor takes all prices as given. Agents have identical information about future corporate cash flow and asset prices. Investor m is subjected to a tax rate t m on interest income and z m on equity income. Define the wealth-weighted distribution of tax ratios as For simplicity, the government is assumed to tax capital gains on futures at the ordinary tax rate (as is the case under current U.S. tax law). In fact, the actual tax rate on futures is irrelevant to the investor and inconsequential to the model. Since a futures position requires no initial investment, investor m facing a proportional tax of rate q m on futures profits may undo the tax by increasing his position by the proportion 1/(1 -q m ) (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1981) . This is, in fact, the attribute of futures contracts that makes them effective in this model. The zero 11 It is a simple extension to allow for the index to have positive weight on bonds as well as stocks. 12 Strict monotonicity is not required for the existence of equilibrium, only uniqueness.
basis makes them effectively tax-free instruments. This is why futures are more effective than options in redistributing risk in the economy (in this model). While options could potentially be used by investors instead of futures to achieve the necessary transfer of risk, the inherent tax effects of the options, due to their non-zero basis, would cause problems.
For legal or institutional reasons, no investor may short any type of investment security (a security that involves an up-front investment, unlike a futures contract) beyond a fixed limit.
13
This means that an investor is constrained in the amount she can borrow or short stocks. Without loss of generally, the short sale bounds are assumed to be zero for every investor.
Formally, the constrained maximization problem for investor m is as follows (with B nm , E nm , and F hm defined as m's investment in firm n's bonds, investment in firm n's stock, and futures position for index h, respectively):
13 Short sale constraints are commonly employed in models to prevent unbounded positions due to tax arbitrage (Dammon and Green, 1987 , state conditions under which such short sale constraints are necessary for equilibrium; this model satisfies those conditions since taxes are linear and there exist assets that are linearly dependant on the set of differently taxed assets). A limit on futures positions, both short and long, can also be imposed without affecting the model, so long as the futures limits are not too strict.
Equation ( In the second and final period, firms distribute payouts to bondholders and shareholders, based on their (random) cash flow and their allocation rules (based on the bond contract terms).
Define corporate cash flow as X n ; this is the amount that is split between stock-and bondholders of the firm. Assume that X n is generated by the following (K-1)-factor model:
where n X is expected level of cash flow, f is the vector of systematic risk factors (there are K-1 of them in the economy, normalized to be orthogonal to each other and have expected value of 0) and φ n is idiosyncratic noise that is uncorrelated with the risk factors. It is assumed that a sufficient number of firms exists, such that φ n can be diversified. That is to say that there exists a set of portfolio weights such that the idiosyncratic noise vanishes within the portfolio. Let L be a vector of weights for a portfolio of corporate cash flows that is fully diversified in this sense.
Thus, . 0 ' and 1
Stock and bond returns depend on the payoffs the firm makes on each security. This in turn involves an allocation of the firm's cash flow that depends on bond contract terms. For example, the firm might give the total cash flow up to some maximum amount to bondholders, with the remainder (if any) distributed to shareholders. For purposes of this model, it does not matter precisely how the allocation occurs. It is important that the sum of the payouts to all investors equals the firm's total cash flow. Thus,
(7) ignores the effect of the corporate income tax (and associated debt-tax shield), but inclusion of such a tax in the model would have no material effect. The corporate tax and debt-tax shield would be relevant to firms' choice of capital structure, but in this model capital structure is modeled as being exogenous (see Section IV for a discussion of how the model can be generalized to include endogenous capital structure choice).
The division of cash flow between debt and equity is non-linear, and therefore, it is unlikely that the K-1 risk factors in corporate cash flow are sufficient to characterize all systematic risks in stocks and bonds. Regress stock and bond returns on the K-1 risk factors:
It is not necessarily the case that ζ n is diversifiable in any portfolio consisting exclusively of bonds. Likewise, ψ n might not be diversifiable in any stock portfolio. However, it is possible to construct an additional risk factor, f K , that overcomes the non-linearization of corporate cash flow caused by the stock-bond allocation rule. In particular, construct a portfolio of stocks weighted by L. From (8b), its payoff is ( )
Define f K as the last term in (9), that is
Clearly, f K has expectation zero and is orthogonal to the risk factors in corporate cash flow, by construction. Let f be a vector of K risk factors that includes the risk factors in corporate cash flow and f K , defined in (10). Regress stock and bond returns on the full set of risk factors
All the αs and βs are unchanged from (8a) and (8b), except for α nK and β nK , which are new (this is due to the orthogonality of the risk factors). Moreover, it is clear, given the choice of f K that (6) and (7) 
L L
Thus, given the set of systematic risk factors, f, it is possible to diversify all non-systematic risk using a portfolio consisting entirely of stocks or of bonds. This is critical for the derivation of Proposition 1.
Finally, a portfolio of securities is defined as well-diversified if it exhibits no idiosyncratic risk. That is, its return can be expressed as a linear function of the K risk factors exclusively. Note that the stock and bond portfolios with weights L are well-diversified, but presumably so are many others, including the portfolios of all stocks and of all bonds.
Given the model developed above, the following proposition specifies sufficient (but not necessary) conditions under which a portfolio choice equilibrium exists with clientele formation and tax-risk separation in asset returns. 
Proof: Appendix A.
Since the futures contracts span the systematic risk factors and their taxation is irrelevant, they offer a perfect means for optimizing risk. Investors can choose any well-diversified portfolio of stocks or bonds and use futures positions to achieve any risk exposure desired. Thus, investors can choose tax efficient portfolios without sacrificing any risk optimality. They select assets that yield the highest after-tax riskfree-equivalent return and form pure clienteles based solely on their tax characteristics. Likewise, investors choose risk exposures based only on the shapes of their utility functions and tax-adjusted wealth. 15 Taxes and risk can be separated from each other in both decision making and pricing, as the following corollary states.
Corollary 1: The Tax-Risk Separation Theorem a) An asset's return is linearly separable into two pieces, one which corresponds exclusively to the tax characteristics of the asset (r b and r z ) and one which corresponds
exclusively to the risk characteristics of the asset (γ n ′r f and λ n ′r f ).
15 Tax-adjusted wealth is initial wealth times one plus the riskfree-equivalent after-tax rate of return on either stocks or bonds, whichever is the optimal asset.
b) An alternative characterization of the tax-risk separation in asset pricing is in terms of state prices. Specifically, if q b is the vector of state prices for valuing bonds, then the following is the vector of state prices for valuing stocks:
. 1 
c) Investors can optimize taxes without regard to risk characteristics of assets by maximizing the after-tax value of the tax component of returns. Similarly, investors can optimize risk without regard to tax characteristics of assets by using effectively tax-free futures contracts.
The tax-risk separation theorem validates prior research that considered either the effect of taxes or risk on portfolio choice and asset pricing without explicitly accounting for the other (e.g. Miller, 1977, and Ross, 1976) . The approach of considering each objective in isolation is not only simpler, but also correct if a sufficient number of index futures contracts exists. In fact, with these few index futures in the economy, an even stronger result obtains. Taxes do not affect resource allocation or welfare in any manner, except through wealth redistribution, as the following corollary states. This corollary indicates that if you adjust endowments for the wealth effects of taxes, you do not need to know anything else about the tax system to characterize the influence of risk in asset pricing. You could construct certainty equivalents to all risky streams without reference to the distribution of tax rates in the economy. In turn, to analyze the effect of taxes on portfolio choice and asset prices, you could convert all risky streams to their certainty equivalents (which do not depend on taxes) and model investors as if they are risk-neutral. Numerous papers have taken these approaches (analyzed risk in a tax-free environment and analyzed taxes in a risk-free environment); these corollaries validate the generality of such models.
equilibrium interest rate. The point of the corollary is to suggest that the consumption-investment margin could be Returning to Proposition 1, it can be seen that if equity is tax-advantaged relative to debt (i.e. z m < t m for all investors), then r z < r b . The risk-adjusted rate of return on equity is less than the risk-adjusted return on debt, a phenomenon known as implicit tax. This implicit tax is necessary to compensate bondholders for paying higher taxes than stockholders. The exact level of the implicit tax depends on the identity of the marginal clientele. The marginal clientele is the clientele whose relative tax rates make it just indifferent between holding debt and equity. If the marginal clientele has a strong tax preference for equity, the implicit tax will be high; if the marginal clientele is a tax-exempt entity, the implicit tax will be zero. The identity of the marginal clientele depends on both the distribution of tax rates among investors and the aggregate debt / equity ratio.
IV. Extensions and Applications of the Model
The tax-risk separation theorem and tax-neutrality corollaries can be extended to consider corporate level decisions, such as capital structure, dividend policy, and real investment. With the inclusion of corporate income taxes (with interest deductibility), the model can easily be extended in a manner consistent with the leverage irrelevance model of Miller (1977) . In that case, notwithstanding the effects of capital structure on the risk characteristics of a firm's debt and equity, 17 it is optimal to issue debt or equity exclusively depending on whether the combination of corporate income and capital gain taxes exceeds the ordinary tax rate of the marginal clientele. Consequently, an interior general equilibrium (with positive quantities of both debt and equity in the economy) requires that the marginal clientele have tax rates that the only margin on which capital income taxes have a distortionary effect. 17 Grossman and Stiglitz (1977) , as well as several other papers, point out that in incomplete markets, changes in the risk characteristics of a firm's securities in response to corporate decisions, particularly capital structure, could affect shareholder investment opportunities (and thus utility) and should be a relevant factor in making these decisions.
exactly equalize the total tax burden of debt and equity; and in that case, each firm is indifferent regarding its capital structure. This result is identical to Miller (1977) except that it does not require the risk-neutrality assumption in Miller, and is less restrictive than prior models of leverage irrelevance that allow risk-aversion. 18 So long as the requirements of the tax-risk separation theorem hold (in particular, that a set of spanning futures contracts exists), the complications introduced by risk drop away leaving a model that substantively behaves as if agents are risk-neutral.
This approach can be extended to establish dividend irrelevance 19 and to demonstrate that corporate investment is invariant to capital income taxes (including corporate income taxes).
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This second result is a broad extension of Corollary 2 (tax-neutrality) and builds on Stiglitz (1973) . Whereas Stiglitz develops a model in which portfolio and capital structure choice are influenced by taxes but firm-level production and investment are not, the tax-risk separation theorem allows for a model in which none of these decisions are affected by taxes (at least not in any efficiency reducing manner; taxes could induce shifts along the Pareto frontier). The only margin along which capital income taxes could distort the economy and generate deadweight loss is the savings-consumption decision (since capital income taxes penalize saving).
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that when investors face differential linear taxes on interest and capital gains, the availability of a limited set of stock index futures contracts 21 guarantees that:
i) investors will separate into tax clienteles investing in either debt or equity exclusively (Proposition 1),
ii) asset returns will be linearly separable into pure tax-based and pure risk-based components (Corollary 1),
iii) equivalently, state price vectors for valuing stocks and bonds will be proportional, so that the equivalent martingale measure of each type of security is identical (Corollary 1), iv) taxes do not distort portfolio choice in a way that creates deadweight loss (Corollary 2), v) and consequentially, the equivalent martingale measure for the economy is independent of the tax system (Corollary 2).
One key result in this paper is iv; capital income taxes have only wealth effects, not substitution effects on resource allocation (holding the level of saving fixed). As discussed in Section III, this result can be extended to corporate-level finance, production, and investment decisions. While taxes could alter these decisions, they simply shift them along the Pareto frontier, generating no sub-optimal resource allocation or deadweight cost. Apart from a potential effect on the saving-consumption decision, capital income taxes do not cause any inefficiency.
The main result in this study is the separability of tax and risk incentives, represented by findings ii, iii, and v. The prospect of tax-risk separation is particularly important in justifying the common research strategy of modeling taxes and risk independently, as it eliminates the concern that they could confound each other. As v states, the appropriate measure of certainty equivalence does not depend on the tax system. Therefore it is legitimate for a modeler to adjust all risky streams to their certainty equivalents and then analyze the effects of taxes in a world of essentially risk neutral agents. The assumption of risk neutrality has been assumed in several tax models, 22 and this paper demonstrates that the results of these models are generalizable to economies with risk-aversion. The converse of this situation is also true; models of how risk influences asset prices and returns, and how investors select risk exposures, that have been developed under the assumption of no taxes are generalizable to economies with taxes.
Extending this analysis to empirical research, it is clear that researchers cannot simply ignore one of the effects (taxes or risk) while focusing on the other. Asset prices and returns exhibit both tax and risk effects commingled. One cannot, for example, estimate risk premia or control for risk using a model that does not account for taxes, as is commonly done, due to misspecification. 23 While the Tax-Risk Separation Theorem does not eliminate the need to untangle tax and risk effects in empirical studies, it does suggest that these effects have a simple additive form. Thus, valid empirical estimation can be conducted in a two step procedure in which the tax effect is estimated in one step (controlling for risk by subtracting risk premia from stock 22 Recent examples include Kemsley and Williams (2001) , who develop a model of dividend policy in which such policy is irrelevant because the dividend tax is fully capitalized into stock prices regardless of timing (and is thus a sunk cost), and Williams (2001) , who develops a three-clientele model (individuals, corporations, and tax-exempts) with stocks (with varying dividend yields), bonds, and municipal bonds. With effective risk neutrality, he derives a non-linear relationship between stock returns and dividend yields and derives municipal bond yields that are complex functions of individual and corporate tax rates for dividends and capital gains. 23 For example, many papers test hypotheses regarding abnormal returns (including event studies and market efficiency studies). These papers use a risk model (such as the CAPM) to construct expected returns. Since the CAPM estimates each stock's expected return as the certainty equivalent return plus β times the excess of the stock market return over the certainty equivalent return, a mis-specification occurs if the researcher uses the certainty equivalent bond instead of certainty equivalent stock return (r b instead of r z in the nomenclature of this paper). Even if the purpose of the study is a cross-sectional comparison (in which case the intercept drops out), the mismeasurement of the slope on β can be problematic if β is correlated with the variable of interest in the study. 
By the assumption that the first K futures span the risk factors, Π is invertible.
Consider the stock in firm n. Based on (11b), its unexpected return can be expressed as 
the same, but idiosyncratic risk will be less for the well-diversified portfolio, which is desirable since the utility function is concave.
An investor m with a well-diversified portfolio that includes bond n, could sell ω dollars of the bond and buy ω dollars of stock s. The systematic risk effect of this transaction could be offset with suitable futures trades as previously shown. Given the returns expressed in (12a) and (12b), the expected return of this arbitrage is
This expected return is negative if condition (13) holds, demonstrating that keeping the bond is desirable and, in fact, selling any stocks to buy more bonds improves expected return, while the level of risk can be maintained at a constant level so long as the investor continues to hold a well-diversified portfolio. If condition (13) holds, m will trade stocks for bonds until the short sale constraint (3) binds. At that point, m will only hold bonds, which is optimal. Of course, any well-diversified portfolio of bonds is as good as any other.
A similar argument applies if condition (13) strictly fails. In that case, expected return can be increased by selling all bonds and buying stocks while taking appropriate futures positions to maintain constant risk. The assumption that Y is strictly monotonic guarantees that (13) fails weakly (i.e. the ratio of risk-free returns equals the ratio of tax rates) for a set of investors with measure zero. However, for those investors, there is no gain from exchanging any stock or bond for any other asset. In that case, any well-diversified portfolio is equally desirable.
c) The final equilibrium issue involves the market clearing conditions (4). The ratio of risk-free returns r z /r b will adjust to a level such that (13) holds for enough investors to buy all available bonds and (13) c) is a direct restatement of portfolio strategy in Proposition 1.
Corollary 2
With taxes on returns, the portfolio choice problem can be characterized, given (1), (2),
and (12) Capital gains tax rate of investor m α nk Coefficient on factor k in regression of n's stock payout on the risk factors β nk Coefficient on factor k in regression of n's bond payout on the risk factors ε n Unexpected return on n's stock φ n Idiosyncratic noise in n's cash flow γ hn
Coefficient on index h in regression of n's bond return on the first K futures η h Unexpected profit on futures contract h λ hn
Coefficient on index h in regression of n's stock return on the first K futures ν n Unexpected return on n's bonds µ hk Coefficient on factor k in regression of n's cash flow on the risk factors π hk Coefficient on factor k in linear combination of the factors that equals η h θ A state of nature ω Dollar amount of incremental portfolio change ψ n Residual noise in the total payout to n's stockholders using K-1 risk factors ψ * n Residual noise in the total payout to n's stockholders using K risk factors ζ n Residual noise in the total payout to n's bondholders using K-1 risk factors ζ * n Residual noise in the total payout to n's bondholders using K risk factors
